



While abortion has been legal in most developed countries for many years, the topic remains 
controversial. A major area of controversy concerns women’s rights vis a vis the rights of 
health professionals to opt out of providing the service on conscience grounds. Although 
scholars from various disciplines have addressed this issue in the literature there is a lack of 
empirical research on the topic. This paper provides a documentary analysis of three examples 
of conscientious objection on religious grounds to performing abortion-related care by 
midwives in different Member States of the European Union, two of which have resulted in 
legal action. These examples show, that as well as the laws of the respective countries and the 
European Union, professional and church law each played a part in the decisions made. 
However, support from both professional and religious sources was inconsistent both within 
and between the examples. The authors conclude that there is a need for clear guidelines at 
both local and pan-European level for health professionals and recommends a European wide 
forum to develop and test them. 
 





INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND  
In the 1950s debates arose in political circles in Europe and elsewhere concerning the high 
numbers of women dying or being seriously mutilated from illegal abortions. Subsequently, 
laws ensuring the safe provision of abortion were gradually enacted with abortion on demand 
now available in 69% of the world’s developed countries. Due to a shortage of medical 
practitioners, it is often midwives or nurses who provide abortion services. This is strongly 
supported by the World Health Organisation (WHO) which recommends that midwives or 
nurses should be the key providers in the provision of abortion care. [1] Abortion remains a 
morally contentious issue with some midwives and other health professionals refusing to 
participate in them on the grounds of conscience. The decision to lodge conscientious 
objection to the provision of abortion services however means that other health professionals 
must assume an additional workload that they may resent.  
Freedom of conscience is at the heart of human rights and in Europe it is protected in treaties 
such as the Council of Europe’s Resolution 1763. [2, 3] The right to conscientious objection 
is enshrined in most European countries’ abortion laws, though Sweden is a notable 
exception, which will be referred to later in this paper. In the WHO’s recent guidelines on 
abortion, [4] however, conscientious objection is not mentioned. Conversely, the International 
Confederation of Midwives’ Code of Ethics [5] states that ‘midwives may decide not to 
participate in activities for which they hold deep moral opposition’. 
There is still polarisation in views on how much weight to give to the rights and 
responsibilities of healthcare providers to offer a service and their rights to make 
conscientious objections to certain practices. Authors on both sides of the debate state that 
European countries should critically assess the laws governing conscientious objection and 
their effects on women’s legal rights to a service. [6, 7] None, however, go so far as to make 
suggestions as to how this could be achieved.  
The seminal work of Wicclair [8] provides a balanced overview between conscience and duty 
to provide care, concluding that carte blanche rights of conscientious objection should not be 
given but rather respect for the moral integrity of the physician, even in practices endorsed by 
the medical profession, is the best way forward. Wicclair’s work has gained considerable 
support from a diverse group of authors in law, philosophy and medicine because it argues 
that the most promising ethical justification for conscientious objection is respect for moral 
integrity. This, however, is challenged by others who argue that the core ethical values on 
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which decisions are based need to correspond with one or more core values in medicine. [9 -
11]  
Some writers challenge the rights of health care professionals to allow their private values to 
interfere with their work. [12, 13] Others have delineated criteria for conscientious objection 
adding responsibilities which should accompany this stance. [14, 15] The International 
Federation of Obstetricians and Gynecologists’ criteria for conscientious objection, for 
example, involve providing notice of professional services that practitioners decline to 
undertake on conscience grounds, referring patients to colleagues timeously and providing 
emergency care where required. [16] 
McHale [17] acknowledges the change from surgical to medical abortions and concludes that 
the time has come to revise public policy and not to permit nurses to opt out of procedures 
such as abortion. A White Paper drawing on the international literature from a number of 
disciplines attempts to sum up the issue and develop a road map for the future. [18] Its authors 
give clear acknowledgement of the lack of well carried out relevant empirical research but 
conclude, from the available evidence, that there is a growing trend towards refusal to provide 
certain reproductive health services especially abortion. Acknowledging the difficulty of the 
situation, they recommend that a standard definition of conscientious objection be developed 
together with accompanying guidelines that set out healthcare professionals’ obligations and 
duties. However, this White Paper falls short of providing them.  
AIM 
In the light of the polarised debate highlighted above, the aim of this paper is to address some 
of the gaps in the empirical evidence on this issue, by providing a documentary analysis of 
examples of conscientious objection to participating in abortion by midwives in three 
European countries: Scotland, Croatia and Sweden. Each author of this paper each has a 
differing stance on abortion but all support the right of conscientious objection.  
METHODS 
Data were collected from material in publicly available sources. Thereafter, the legal teams 
involved, following discussion with their clients, provided the authors with additional data 
including letters written as part of evidence used in the legal cases. A documentary analysis of 
each example was carried out. Each example is presented and then in the discussion the 
commonalities and differences are considered. 
RESULTS 
Example 1: Mary Doogan and Constanza Wood (Scotland, (UK)) 
  
4 
This case involved two senior midwives, Mary Doogan and Constanza Wood, each with over 
20 years’ professional midwifery experience. Both are Roman Catholics with declared 
conscientious objection throughout their careers in accord with the UK law on abortion. [19] 
The case ran from 2005 to 2014 and involved a major Glasgow hospital. The situation giving 
rise to the conflict was that following service restructuring, the midwives believed that they 
were required to engage with the process of procuring abortion.  
The midwives made numerous attempts to resolve the issue informally, but eventually lodged 
a formal grievance which escalated to Health Board level where it was rejected. Following the 
exhaustion of the grievance process, the midwives petitioned the courts for a judicial review 
based on section 4(1) of the Abortion Act and Article 9 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. [2, 3] The question under consideration was, ‘Are the respondents [Greater 
Glasgow and Clyde Health Board (GGCHB)] entitled to require them to delegate, supervise 
and support staff in the treatment of patients undergoing termination of pregnancy?’ [20] The 
single judge judged that the midwives, due to their seniority, were not being required to play 
any direct part in bringing about the termination of pregnancy and therefore ruled against 
them.  
In the midwives’ appeal [21] it was acknowledged that in the previous hearing GGCHB 
accepted that some of their arguments would have to be decided on a day to day basis as any 
of them could involve direct contact with the woman involved. The new argument put 
forward by the midwives was that care for women undergoing abortions was not something 
that took place at a defined time but involved the bringing together of many factors in 
addition to drug administration, many of which were ultimately dependent on each woman’s 
physiological and psychological reactions. In their ruling in favour of the midwives, the three 
appeal judges concurred that the conscience clause applied to all provisions in which abortion 
could be legally carried out. 
GGCHB’s counter appeal took place at the UK Supreme Court, London. [22] In addition to 
the solicitors for the midwives and GGCHB, two interveners, the Royal College of Midwives 
(RCM) and the British Pregnancy Advisory Service (BPAS), made oral submissions. In the 
hearing the five judges established that the case was about the precise scope of the right of 
conscientious objection to participating in abortion. 
The Supreme Court judges, after agreeing on a definition of abortion, focused on the meaning 
of the word ‘participate’ and expressed the view that it is only applicable to the provision of 
hands on care. They then proceeded to test this against the arguments submitted initially by 
the midwives. In their findings, the judges ruled that being present to assist and support if 
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medical intervention were required was the only situation that should be fully covered by the 
conscience clause. Some others, such as monitoring the progress of patients to ensure that any 
deviations from normality are referred to an obstetrician, could be covered in particular 
circumstances; such as when a junior midwife required a more expert opinion. GGCHB’s 
appeal was thus supported.  
Concern was immediately expressed by both lawyers and ethicists that rather than being a 
landmark case the narrow interpretation of the conscience clause has not provided clear 
guidance for the future as there seemed to be no underpinning rationale given for its adoption, 
Neal pointing out that the Supreme Court’s reliance on a simplistic formula “collapses under 
scrutiny” [23](p. 682).  
 
Example 2: Jaga Stojak (Croatia) 
The second example is that of Jaga Stojak, a Croatian Roman Catholic midwife with 27 years’ 
professional experience. The matter was based in Hrvatski Ponos hospital, Knin, from 2013-
2015. The situation that gave rise to the example was that Stojak was asked to provide direct 
abortion care after the appointment of a new head of obstetrics and gynaecology stated that she 
saw no grounds for conscientious objection by midwives (Mikulandra N Jaga Stojak: 
explanatory email to V Fleming 15 November, 2015). This was against Stojak´s declared 
conscientious objection to participating in abortion, legal under the Croatian Constitution, 
which had been respected for many years in her workplace. 
After Stojak was asked to assist at a surgical abortion she advised her manager that on 
conscience grounds she could not do this, as it was not a procedure necessary for saving the 
life of the woman concerned. Disciplinary action was initiated against Stojak, and appeals to 
the hospital management were unsuccessful. Stojak was first suspended, then ultimately 
dismissed from her position. 
Stojak sought advice from a Croatian Non Governmental Organisation, the Vigilares, who 
claimed that the hospital management failed to hear and respect her rights both as a taxpayer 
and employee whose position had been respected for many years and was apparently changed 
without reason. A lawyer was appointed to take Stojak’s case.  
A series of letters between the lawyer and hospital management then followed with the initial 
letter laying out Stojak’s claim of illegal dismissal (Letter from N Mikulandra to Antonela 
Kračić, November 2013 case number 012505/13.) and the hospital’s reply citing a patient 
complaint which was dismissed by Stojak’s lawyer as irrelevant to Stojak’s legal position 
(Letter from Antonela Kračić to N Mikulandra 17 December 2013 case number 4004/13). The 
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complaint was not mentioned in subsequent internal procedures by either party. Concurrently, 
the Vigilares wrote to the Minister of Health concerning Stojak’s position and asking for his 
intervention (Letter from Udruga Vigilare Dr. sc. Vice John Batarelo to Prof. dr. sc. Rajko 
Ostojić Croatian Minister of Health 8 August 2013).  
A carefully planned and executed series of press releases from the Vigilares then saw the case 
making national and international headlines.  All of these actions resulted in Stojak returning 
to her employment but in a different position in early 2014 and her right to conscientious 
objection respected. The interventions by Stojak’s lawyer and the Vigilares prevented court 
proceedings from being initiated.  
Example 3: Ellinor Grimmark (Sweden) 
Ellinor Grimmark, a newly qualified midwife, is a Pentecostal Christian. She sought 
employment in three hospitals but each time after she explained that because of her faith she 
could not perform abortions, offers of employment were rescinded. 
First, she was offered a position in Höglands women’s clinic in Eksjö, during the course of an 
internship, but after she explained that because of her faith she could not perform abortions, 
she received a telephone message from the manager of the labour and maternity ward saying 
that the offer was withdrawn. She was later advised that the clinic could not create 
exemptions from certain tasks to be performed and that all midwives must be prepared to care 
for women undergoing abortions.   
Grimmark next sought work as a midwife in Ryhov’s women's clinic, having advised the 
potential employers of her stance against abortion but was again denied employment on the 
same grounds. She later applied for a position as a midwife in Varnamo hospital women's 
clinic. During the interview, the discussion centred on how she could be facilitated to work in 
the clinic, respecting her views and the needs of the clinic, and this resulted in an offer of 
work for six months. However, ten days later the employer withdrew the job offer. 
Finally Grimmark sought recourse in law, notifying the County Council of discrimination 
against her because of her religious beliefs. Sweden, unlike the countries in the above 
mentioned examples, does not have a law protecting workers’ conscientious objection and the 
reason given for rejecting Grimmark’s claim was that she was unable to fulfil the role of a 
midwife.[24] The Council and later the Discrimination Ombudsman found against Grimmark. 
Grimmark, represented by legal counsel and with the backing of the international organisation 
‘Alliance Defending Freedom’, then submitted her case against Jönköping County Council, as 
the provider of health services in each of the three hospitals, to the District Court of 
Jönköping. Her lawyers contended that this is part of an emerging human rights’ problem in 
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Sweden (Letter from Ruth Nordström to Ombudsman for discrimination, Jönköping re Ellinor 
Grimmark. 21 May, 2014). 
On 14 September 2015 an ‘amicus curiae’ letter was submitted from the European Centre for 
Law and Justice as part of evidence to be considered. [25] Focusing throughout on freedom of 
conscience as a basic human right, the letter’s conclusion points out that Sweden is isolated in 
Europe with its lack of provision for conscientious objection to abortion. However, the letter 
states that it should be considered as:  
a right not to take part in the voluntary termination of a human life when such 
termination is permitted by law, whether you have a religious belief or not. Thus, 
the purpose of the ‘conscience clause’ is less to permit anyone to object than to 
make sure that no one is forced to participate against their will.  
The initial case was heard in September 2015 with Grimmark seeking non-pecuniary damages 
only rather than compensation for lost earnings. Another claim concerns discrimination in that 
her status as a conscientious objector is not recognised and yet another concerns violation of 
the European Convention article 9. The three judges of the District Court ruled against 
Grimmark on the grounds that the region has an obligation to provide guaranteed access 
to abortion and that carrying out abortions was a necessary part of Swedish midwives’ 
duties. Thus the hospitals’ grounds for refusing employment were legitimate and 
Grimmark could not have suffered discrimination. [26] She was, however, given leave to 
appeal. 
DISCUSSSION  
Each of the above examples concerns midwives in European Union countries with its inherent 
principle of free movement within the labour market. As indicated in the introduction it is 
often midwives or nurses who carry the bulk of responsibility for women undergoing 
abortions. However, from the summaries of the examples provided, it is clear that there are 
many complex factors impacting on the right to conscientious objection to abortion that may 
differ from country to country and it is these which are discussed next.  
Legal systems 
In two out of the three countries concerned, conscientious objection to provision of abortion is 
enshrined in law. However, the major issues which gave rise to each example have been 
dependent on interpretations of the law in each country. Two of the examples, Scotland and 
Sweden, resulted in court cases, and that in Croatia also threatened it.   
The UK Abortion Act, [19] states that ‘no person shall be under any duty ….to participate in 
any treatment authorised by this Act to which he has a conscientious objection.’ A major issue 
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in the Scottish case was that of ‘what actually constitutes carrying out the abortion?’ In a 
previous UK case [27] petitioners requested clarity on the legality of nurses taking part in 
mid-trimester abortions carried out by medical means. The five judges ruled that nurses and 
midwives caring for the women were part of the process and thus covered by the conscience 
clause:  
‘Termination of pregnancy’ is an expression commonly used, perhaps rather more 
by medical people than by laymen, to describe in neutral and unemotive terms the 
bringing about of an abortion. So used, it is capable of covering the whole process 
designed to lead to that result, and in my view it does so in the present context. 
Other provisions of the Act make it clear that termination of pregnancy is 
envisaged as being a process of treatment.  
Thus it was clearly established that abortion was considered to be a process rather than a 
single act or combination of acts. This ruling has relevance across all the examples as the 
procedure for abortion changes from a surgical to a medical one, thereby potentially involving 
more midwives.  
In Croatia there is no one single law. Instead the legislation on conscientious objection is 
linked to individual professions with doctors being regulated by the Law on Medical Practice, 
which states that a doctor ‘has the right to conscientious objection…… if this does not cause 
permanent damage to the health or the patient’s life’. [28] Equally, the Nursing Act allows 
conscientious objection for nurses. [29] As there was no midwifery education outside of 
nursing training at the time of Stojak’s training, she was educated as a nurse and came under 
nursing legislation. [30] Although midwifery became recognised as a separate profession 
from nursing in 2009, there are still no specific laws for midwives thus leaving the legal 
position of midwives wishing to exercise conscientious objection to abortion in some doubt.  
Church law 
In the Scottish and Croatian examples the midwives concerned were Roman Catholic, whose 
universal Code of Canon Law:1398 states that anyone who procures a completed abortion is 
liable to automatic excommunication. [31] As with the ambiguity in the Scottish case 
surrounding the nature of the word `participate’, canon 1398 introduces two words which may 
also assume differing meanings, those of ‘completed abortion’. The question of relevance 
remains ‘what completes the abortion?’  
In a commentary, [32] the potential extent of those involved in procuring abortion is 
discussed as technically, once labour starts, an abortion could proceed with the woman 
unaccompanied by any health professionals. This is the situation, however, that legalisation of 
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abortion sought to overcome as it leads to unnecessary maternal deaths.  Other commentaries, 
however, make the stronger point that the word ‘procure’ means to perform or cooperate in 
the act of abortion, which must be carried out ‘with malicious intent’. [33, 34] In them the 
important issue is the notion of ‘levels’ at which accomplices are involved, as there appears to 
be no fixed definition of those who participate in the abortion. The notion of ‘co-delinquency’ 
is first discussed suggesting that this term applies to persons who cooperate in a ‘single 
delinquent action’ claiming the most important issue is that of unity of purpose; in this case 
the procuring of a completed abortion. The Roman Catholic Church’s law applicability to the 
midwives in two of the examples is clear but the other two churches do not have comparable 
legal codes, leaving fewer religious grounds upon which their members can base their actions. 
Professional legislation 
As noted above, Scotland has a conscience clauses allowing all health professionals to opt out 
of participating in caring for women undergoing abortions and Croatia has this for the nursing 
and medical professions but there remains no specific law concerning midwives’ and 
conscientious objection [35]. Sweden, with no conscience clause, has no professional 
guidelines associated with the provision of abortion and indeed the Swedish Midwives’ 
Association has spoken out against them. [36] It is also noteworthy that following release of 
the judgement on the Scottish case, the UK’s Nursing and Midwifery Council’s Code of 
Conduct, binding on all registered midwives, has been updated to include only a limited right 
to conscientious objection and the necessity for onward referral in such cases. [37] In this, the 
need for careful thought before taking such a step was emphasised and accountability for any 
decisions related to conscientious objection placed in the hands of individual practitioners.  
Support  
Support from churches 
Each of the midwives conscientiously objected on religious grounds; all being practising 
Christians of various denominations. Yet support from the various churches concerned has 
been mixed. In the Swedish case, Grimmark’s church has provided active support but as it is a 
minority religion in Sweden with less than 1% of the population being members, it appears to 
hold little sway. Support from the Roman Catholic Church was forthcoming for the Scottish 
midwives from their individual and other parishes. However, it is noteworthy that, despite 
their public statement condemning abortion on the 40th anniversary of the Act, the Catholic 
Bishops’ Conference of Scotland neither commented on the case nor publicly offered its 
support. [38] The failure to produce a strong statement stands in total contrast to the situation 
in Croatia where there was a great deal of publically voiced support from the Catholic 
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Church’s hierarchy. The Justice and Peace arm of the Croatian Bishops’ Conference released 
a statement of support, [39] other bishops gave statements to the press and the provincial of 
one of the major religious orders [40] called for support and prayers while referring to Canon 
1398 and the Second Vatican Council Resolution Gaudium et Spes. [41]  
Support from professional organisations 
It appears that none of the midwives received any support from their respective professional 
midwifery organisations. This is despite all Associations being members of the International 
Confederation of Midwives whose Code of Ethics, [5] as shown in the introduction, permits 
conscientious objection. While the law in Sweden contains no conscience clause, 
conscientious objection is supported by the European Convention of Human Rights and might 
have been considered relevant. 
Not only did the midwives in the Scottish and Croatian cases receive no active support but 
conversely their professional organisations spoke out against them. The Croatian Midwives’ 
Association in response to a number of requests issued a press release advising of that while 
the case is sub judice they were unable to take a stand. [35] This still remains in effect despite 
the completion of the case. However, a request to the Ministry of Heath for an amendment to 
the Midwives’ Act had not been actioned. In the same press release the Association’s 
president commented that she is unable to speak about a particular case and she has not done 
so in public since.  
The Royal College of Midwives of the UK has issued guidance stating that a midwife may 
have to weigh up her own position in relation to each woman’s interests and hand over her 
care to another midwife if she sees conflicts arising due to her conscience. Moreover, it added 
that ‘all midwives should be prepared to care for women before, during and after a 
termination in a maternity unit under obstetric care’. [42] In the legal proceedings it 
consistently took the side of the Health Board rather than the midwives. The evidence given 
in the Supreme Court by the RCM clearly stated that its policy makers believed conscientious 
objection should be restricted to administration of the drugs rather than including care of the 
woman during the subsequent labour or birth. [22] This could be argued to be contrary to its 
position on continuity of care which states that continuity of care is the most defining element 
of midwifery practice and is what distinguishes it from other professions. [43] 
The aim of this paper was to address some of the gaps in the empirical evidence on the issue 
of conscientious objection to the provision of abortion through a documentary analysis. The 
findings of this documentary analysis not only outlined that support of different churches in 
different European countries was equivocal but also that support from the professional 
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organisations was lacking. This permitted the formulation of the following conclusions with 
their foundations in real situations.  
CONCLUSIONS 
The examples examined appear similar in that midwives in three European countries chose, 
on grounds of conscience, not to participate in the provision of care to women undergoing 
abortions. Each of the midwives faced hostile reactions from colleagues, professional 
associations and managers, which were escalated in various ways; two of them reaching the 
court system. It is clear, however, that there is a discrepancy between the legislation on 
conscientious objection of three of the countries and the way that the midwives in the three 
examples presented have been treated. Additionally, there is no unanimous agreement on the 
right of conscientious objection within each country and there are no pan European 
guidelines. However, as the European Court of Human Rights regularly reminds petitioners, 
‘freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the foundations of a democratic 
society’. [3] It may be timely for positive action to be made towards developing such 
guidelines for midwives, nurses and other health professionals who have the right of free 
movement within EU Member States in order for consistency in practice.  
The expectation that midwifery practice may include the provision of abortion services often 
fails to take account of the freedom of conscience as the heart of human rights [2] whereby 
midwives or other health professionals choose not to provide such services and which has 
been legislated by the Council of Europe’s parliamentary assembly. [3] By reflecting on the 
three examples presented in this article, it became apparent that the professional practice of 
midwives was challenged when they refused to provide abortion-related care.  
The general support from churches and the lack of it from professional organisations suggest 
that there is a need for reflection throughout Europe on current practice. Such reflections 
should be multidisciplinary in nature and not only consider how the provision of safe abortion 
services can be facilitated but also how health professionals’ decisions to object on 
conscience grounds to the participation in abortion related care can be managed. The 
provision of `Freedom of conscience´ as the heart of human rights requires in its practical 
implementation that such decisions are respected and do not lead to discrimination in 
professional practice. This article identified an urgent need for a European wide forum to 
develop guidelines and test these in the light of the European Council’s legislation and 
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